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I.

INTRODUCTION

The 2016 presidential election has led to a great deal of uncertainty
about future United States policies and practices, particularly for those who
work in the field of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) or International
Humanitarian Law (IHL), as it is alternatively called. 1 In particular, the
future of the Department of Defense detention facility at Guantanamo Bay
Naval Station (Guantanamo) raises questions since many of the existing

*
Andrea Harrison is the Deputy Legal Advisor for the International Committee of the Red
Cross’s Regional Delegation for the United States and Canada. She also serves on the Board of
Directors for the American Branch of the International Law Association. Andrea is currently pursuing a
PhD in Law at the University of Leicester. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of
the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the ICRC.
1.
What is International Humanitarian Law?, ICRC (July 1, 2004), https://www.icrc.org/e
ng/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf.
The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and International
Humanitarian Law (IHL) are two names for the same body of law, which includes the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977.
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processes and conditions were established as a matter of policy, rather than
law, and therefore could potentially be scrapped on a whim. 2 One very
important example of this, and the subject matter of this paper, is that
Guantanamo detainees are currently entitled to periodic reviews on the
necessity of their continued detention by the United States.3 Reviews of the
necessity of detention are explicitly foreseen by IHL, but the rules for
detainees captured in relation to a non-international armed conflict (NIAC)
are unclear.4 At least as a matter of policy, the United States has always
provided reviews to NIAC detainees, but each iteration has been quite
different.5
The so-called “Periodic Review Boards” (PRBs) are the latest iteration
of review processes provided to the detainees in Guantanamo. 6 Through
this process, detainees deemed not to pose a significant threat to United
States security are placed on a transferable list at which point the State
Department searches for repatriation or resettlement options. 7 The
Executive Order issued by President Trump on January 30th, 2018,
confirmed the continuation of the PRBs for current Guantanamo detainees
and extended them to any potential new arrivals. 8 In this author’s view,
PRBs are the most transparent and consistent with international legal
principles in comparison to previous review processes, but serious flaws
remain and should be addressed, including issues related to independence,
impartiality and the protection against self-incrimination. Should these
flaws be directly addressed, the PRBs could provide an efficient and
meaningful way of ensuring detainees are not held any longer than is
absolutely necessary (i.e., only as long as such individuals pose an
imperative threat to security). These processes are not a substitute for
continued access to the courts through the writ of habeas corpus, but as
habeas has been ruled not to apply in similar cases to battlefield zones like

2.
Here the author does not refer to minimum conditions to meet humane treatment standards
under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 or other legal standards that may apply,
but rather other policies as review processes or transfers from Guantanamo.
3.
Periodic Review Secretariat, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., http://www.prs.mil/ (last visited Jan. 29,
2018) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF DEF.].
4.
Detention in Non-International Armed Conflict: The ICRC's Work on Strengthening
Legal Protection, ICRC (Apr. 21, 2015), https://www.icrc.org/eng/what-we-do/other-activities/develop
ment-ihl/strengthening-legal-protection-ihl-detention.htm.
5.
Here one refers to the Detainee Review Boards in Afghanistan or the Administrative
Review Boards in Guantanamo, amongst others.
6.

U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 3.

7.

Id.

8.

See Exec. Order No. 13780, 3 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017).
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Afghanistan or Iraq,9 and habeas can require many years of litigation
including appeals, PRBs should be seen as a necessary parallel track for
law-of-war detainees who may not be subject to any criminal proceedings. 10
Most detainees at Guantanamo were picked up during the conflict in
Afghanistan,11 but the applicable law remains less than clear. Periodic
reviews are set out under the law of international armed conflict (IAC), but
they are not explicitly mentioned in the (sparse) treaty law governing
NIAC.12 An IAC exists wherever there is a resort to force between two or
more states, and an NIAC exists where there is “protracted armed violence
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between
such groups . . . .”13 While not without controversy, the United States
considers that all persons held in Guantanamo are held in relation to an
NIAC.14
The distinction between IAC and NIAC is key because while detained
persons in an IAC have a specific legal status with detailed legal
protections, NIAC rules do not create any kind of special legal status for
detainees and are generally vague or silent on procedural guarantees. 15 The
need for detention during armed conflict is generally not debated, as
detention is viewed as a preferable option than to killing the enemy,
especially if there is no manifest military necessity to do so. 16 Nonetheless,

9.

See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2010).

10.
Guantanamo Bay Periodic Review Board (PRB) Project: Administrative Detention Rights
& Interests of Detainees without Being Charged, THE GITMO OBSERVER, https://gitmoobserver.com/pr
bs/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2018).
11.
Jackie Northam, Q&A About Guantanamo Bay and the Detainees, NPR (June 23, 2005,
12:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4715916. A significant minority
were “rendered” from other countries and held elsewhere before arriving in Guantanamo. See generally
S. Rep. No. 113–288, at 187 (2014).
12.
See Fact Sheet: New Actions on Guantanamo and Detainee Policy, THE WHITE HOUSE
(Mar. 7, 2011), https://lawfare.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/staging/s3fs-public/uploads/2011/03/Fact_
Sheet_-_Guantanamo_and_Detainee_Policy.pdf [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE, Fact Sheet].
13.
See Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, art. 2, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T., 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (it applies to any armed conflict, whether it is
international or non-international) [hereinafter GC IV]; Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94010I,
Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
14.
Chris Jenks, A Matter of Policy: United States Application of the Law of Armed Conflict,
46 SW. L. REV. 337, 337–39 (2017).
15.

Id. at 337, 342, 348.

16.
See Ryan Goodman, The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants, 24 No. 3 E UR. J.
INT’L L. 819, 819 (2013).
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any deprivation of liberty is a serious affront to personal liberties and must
be carefully regulated. 17
There are several factors that make initial detention quite chaotic on a
battlefield—particularly in NIAC and especially when the conflict takes
place outside of the territories of one of the parties.18 If it is an
extraterritorial NIAC, one can imagine there will be language and cultural
barriers present that make it very difficult for the capturing soldier to
identify the status or intent of the captured person. 19 In many contexts, one
or more of the parties will not be in a uniform and thus in the heat of battle,
it will be next to impossible for the capturing soldiers to know whether they
have captured a civilian who just happened to be holding a gun for selfdefense, a civilian who was directly participating in hostilities, or a member
of an organized armed group. 20 A capturing soldier may simply be unable
to make such determinations. These differences all significantly impact the
legality and duration of an individual’s detention. 21
States agreed to detention review mechanisms particularly because of
the difficulties of battlefield detention. 22 The emphasis was put on initial
reviews, as these were intended to help with the status identification of
persons in an IAC (i.e. civilians v. combatants), but states also recognized
the need for periodic reviews, at least for civilians, to protect against
abuses.23 However, states were far less eager to accept such limitations of
NIACs and to have the international community involved in sovereign
internal affairs—even though the need for detention and detention reviews

17.
Ryan Goodman, Authorization versus Regulation of Detention in Non-International
Armed Conflicts, 91 INT’L L. STUD. 155, 159 (2015) [hereinafter Authorization vs. Regulation].
18.
Noam Lubell, Challenges in Applying Human Rights Law to Armed Conflict, 87 INT’L
REV. RED CROSS, 737, 749 (2005).
19.

Id. at 746, 749.

20.

See, e.g., id. at 737, 749.

While the dividing line between combatant and civilian might not always be one hundred percent
clear in international armed conflicts, it is a distinction that can be maintained at most times. Not so is
the situation in non-international armed conflicts, in which this distinction is not as readily visible,
neither on the ground nor in the law. Id. at 749.
21.

Id. at 753–54.

22.
See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 5, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T 316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, construed in Jean S. Pictet, Commentary: III Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 73 (1960) [hereinafter Pictet, Commentary
III].
23.

See, e.g., id. art. 5, 77.
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are similar to an IAC. 24 In fact, this need in NIAC is probably far greater
because there is no “status” in NIACs and thus the military necessity to
detain becomes solely about conduct and whether an individual poses a
threat.25
Some basic legal requirements should prevent NIAC detention from
becoming arbitrary in nature. This should include:
i)

the right to challenge one’s detention before a court, at
least on an initial basis (i.e. habeas corpus),
ii) obligatory, automatic and periodic reviews,
iii) by an independent and impartial board with the final say
in continued detention or release. 26

Much of the debate on detention during NIAC centers on whether such
detention is even authorized by IHL and/or international human rights law
(IHRL). Regardless of the legality of NIAC detention, it takes place in
numerous contexts around the world. In light of the reality—if not the
legality—of NIAC detention, it is essential to determine if and to what
extent these detainees may challenge their detention, and if so, when and
how they may do so. 27
24.
Anna Nelson, Contemporary IHL Challenges: Use of Force and Non-Intentional Armed
Conflicts, INTERCROSS BLOG (Jan. 2, 2014), http://intercrossblog.icrc.org/blog/contemporary-ihlchall
enges-use-of-force-and-non-international-armed-conflicts.
25.
Unfortunately, as Professor Laurie Blank has stated, “[n]either conventional nor
customary law relating to armed conflicts includes any statement regarding the procedural requirements
for detention in non-international armed conflict, particularly administrative detention akin to that
contemplated in the Fourth Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol I.” See Laurie R. Blank,
Complex Legal Frameworks and Complex Operational Challenges: Navigating the Applicable Law
Across the Continuum of Military Operations, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 87, 104 (2012).
26.
Most scholars would also argue that effective assistance of counsel is also necessary to
prevent arbitrary detention during armed conflict, but this is beyond the scope of this paper. See
Internment in Armed Conflict: Basic Rules and Challenges, ICRC, 3, 5, 9 (Nov. 25, 2014), https://
www.icrc.org/en/document/internment-armed-conflict-basic-rules-and-challenges [hereinafter ICRC,
Internment in Armed Conflict].
27.
For those situations which actually amount to armed conflict and thus are governed at
least in part by IHL, there are extensive academic and political debates about the appropriate legal
framework and legal classification of detained persons. See, e.g., James Schoettler, Detention of
Combatants and the Global War on Terror, in 67 THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE LAWS OF WAR: A
MILITARY PERSPECTIVE 131 (Geoffrey S. Corn et al. eds., 2d ed., 2015); Gregory Rose, Preventive
Detention of Individuals Engaged in Transnational Hostilities: Do We Need a Fourth Protocol
Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions?, NEW BATTLEFIELDS, OLD LAWS: CRITICAL DEBATES ON
ASYMMETRIC WARFARE 45–63 (William C. Banks ed., 2011); Peter Vedel Kessing, Security Detention
in UN Peace Operations, in SEARCHING FOR A “PRINCIPLE OF HUMANITY” IN INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 272–303 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2012); Tatyana Eatwell, Selling the Pass:
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The central argument of this article relies on the fact that detention
will take place during armed conflict, regardless of whether such detention
is “lawful” or not, and thus it is better to regulate such detention than to
pretend that it does not happen. This article is not meant to advocate for, or
justify the use of, security detention where it is not otherwise permissible,
but rather focuses on the ways in which detainees may challenge their
detention, regardless of its legality. 28 When parties to NIAC detain
someone, the procedural guarantees should be clear and established in
accordance with international (and/or domestic) law. IHL requires that
persons be released as soon as the reasons necessitating their detention no
longer exist, but this can only be done if appropriate detention review
procedures are put in place. 29 The questions this article seeks to address is
whether periodic reviews of detention in a NIAC are required, whether
Periodic Review Boards meet the minimum legal requirements under
international law, and whether they should be perpetuated by this United
States administration.
Part II covers the existing international legal rules regarding periodic
review of security detention in relation to armed conflict, looking at the law
Habeas Corpus, Diplomatic Relations and the Protection of Liberty and Security of Persons Detained
Abroad, 62 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 727, 727–39 (2013); Oona Hathaway et al., The Power to Detain:
Detention of Terrorism Suspects After 9/11, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 124, 124–77 (2013); Goodman, supra
note 16, at 819–53; Diane Webber, Preventive Detention in the Law of Armed Conflict: Throwing Away
the Key?, 6 J. NAT’ L SEC. L. & POL’Y 167, 167–205 (2012); Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne, The Role of
Necessity in International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, 47 ISR. L. REV. 225 (2014); Deborah
N. Pearlstein, How Wartime Detention Ends, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 625, 625–65 (2014); Ashley E.
Siegel, Some Holds Barred: Extending Executive Detention Habeas Law Beyond Guantanamo Bay, 92
BOS. UNIV. L. REV. 1405, 1405–30 (2012); Laurie R. Blank, Square Peg in a Round Hole: Stretching
Law of War Detention Too Far, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 1169, 1169–93 (2011); Knut Dörmann, Detention
in Non-International Armed Conflicts, 88 INT’L L. STUD. 347, 347–66 (2012); William K. Lietzau,
Detention of Terrorists in the Twenty-First Century, 88 INT’L L. STUD. 323, 323–45 (2012).
28.
In other words, this paper is setting aside the fact that parties may engage in security
detention operations without an appropriate international or domestic legal basis or have chosen to base
detention on a LOAC framework when it would be more appropriate to use a criminal law framework.
Instead, this paper focuses solely on the procedural guarantees that should be in place when detention is
carried out in relation to an (alleged) armed conflict, without taking a position on the validity of that
detention as such.
29.
Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 118, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 132, Aug. 12 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287,
construed in Jean S. Pictet, Commentary: IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, 510 (1958) [hereinafter Pictet, Commentary IV]; see International Committee
of the Red Cross [ICRC], Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Part V, § II, art. 85(4)(b) (1977) [hereinafter
ICRC Protocol]; International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC], Customary International
Humanitarian Law Study, Part V, ch. 37, Rule 128. [hereinafter ICRC CIHL Study].
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of armed conflict, international humanitarian law and international human
rights law. Part III analyzes existing United States law and policy with
respect to periodic reviews of security detention in relation to armed
conflict. Part IV addresses the structure and appropriateness of PRBs for
current and future Guantanamo detainees. Finally, Part V considers how
PRBs comport with IHL and makes recommendations regarding the
existing PRB process and any security detention review processes that the
United States may consider establishing for future non-international armed
conflicts in which it may become involved.
II.

EXISTING INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW ON PERIODIC REVIEW
OF SECURITY DETENTION IN ARMED CONFLICT

This part sets out the legal provisions and the practical reasons for the
existence of periodic reviews of detention in relation to armed conflict,
during both IACs and NIACs. During IACs civilian internees and certain
combatants (e.g. wounded and sick) may be entitled to periodic reviews of
detention, but the lack of black letter law in NIACs requires reliance on
either customary IHL—which is unclear on the matter—or IHRL—which
seems to have certain requirements that may be impossible during
battlefield detention and which does not provide for automatic periodic
reviews.30 The purpose of Part II is to show the current state of
international law—both treaty and customary—and identify where the gaps
exists with respect to detention reviews in NIAC.
Periodic Reviews of Internment in International Armed Conflicts
IHL and IHRL both provide a right to challenge one’s detention, and
there are very particular reasons why all detainees in any armed conflict
should have a mechanism to challenge their detention during an armed
conflict.31

1.

Status in IACs

In order to understand the different review mechanisms in IAC, it is
necessary to understand the different status categories found under IHL.
The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 established two main categories of
persons or “statuses”: combatants and civilians—neither term was

30.

See, e.g., ICRC CIHL Study, supra note 29, at Part V, ch. 32, Rule 99.

31.

See ICRC Protocol, supra note 29, at § I, art. 73(3).
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defined.32 However, captured combatants were referred to as “prisoners of
war” (POW) and this term was clearly defined. 33 Under Article 4 (1) of the
Third Geneva Convention of 1949, “prisoners of war” are defined as
“[m]embers of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as
members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces . .
. .”34 The term “civilians” was not defined until the adoption of the 1977
Additional Protocol I (AP I), where it was simply defined in the negative—
i.e. everyone who is not a combatant (or another defined status) is a
civilian.35
The definition of combatants and civilians is largely
uncontroversial, except in the United States, which generally accepts these
two categories, but has defended a third status (in both IACs and NIACs)
called an unprivileged enemy belligerent. 36
There is one provision that applies to all people detained in an IAC
regardless of whether an individual meets the criteria of to be protected
under one of the Geneva Conventions or AP I (a “protected person”) and
thus entitled to a full panoply of protections—Article 75(3) requires that:

32.

GC IV, supra note 13, at art. 4(1); see also ICRC Protocol, supra note 29, at § II, art. 43,

33.

ICRC Protocol, supra note 29, at § II, art. 44.

50.
34.
GC III, supra note 29, at art. 4(1). There are also certain categories of “non-combatants”
who accompany the armed forces and thus may be entitled to prisoner of war status under Article 4 of
GC III. Id. at art. 4(2)–(6). In 1977, Additional Protocol I (AP I) expanded the definition of combatant
to include individuals who carry weapons openly “a) during each military engagement” and “b) during
such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a military deployment preceding the
launching of an attack in which he is to participate.” ICRC Protocol, supra note 29, at § III, art. 44(3).
35.
The exact wording of Article 50 of AP I states that a “civilian is any person who does not
belong to one of the categories of persons referred to in Article 4 A (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third
Convention and in Article 43 of this Protocol. In case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that
person shall be considered to be a civilian.” ICRC Protocol, supra note 29, at art. 50(1).
36.
The term “unlawful enemy combatant” has also been used. The term “unprivileged
enemy belligerent” has been defined in a variety of materials, including in § 948a (7) of the 2009
Military Commissions Act, where the term was defined as an individual who “(A) has engaged in
hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners; (B) has purposefully and materially
supported hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners; or (C) was a part of al Qaeda at
the time of the alleged offense under this chapter.” 10 U.S.C. § 948(a)(7) (2009).
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Any person arrested, detained or interned for actions related to
the armed conflict shall be informed promptly, in a language he
understands, of the reasons why these measures have been taken.
Except in cases of arrest or detention for penal offences, such
persons shall be released with the minimum delay possible and in
any event as soon as the circumstances justifying the arrest,
detention or internment have ceased to exist.37

AP I does not reference detention review boards, but confirms the already
existing rules of the four Geneva Conventions. 38 While not all states are a
party to AP I, Article 75 is considered customary IHL binding on all parties
during an IAC. 39

2.

Initial Review Mechanisms in IACs

While an IAC presumes that most fighters will be members of a state’s
armed forces—fully recognizable by their uniforms and other indicators
such as ID tags—Article 5 of Geneva Convention III (GC III) explicitly
provides a review mechanism for any person who has “committed a
belligerent act” but where doubt remains as to whether the person is entitled
to POW status.40 While there is a presumption of POW status in such IAC
cases, if there is a doubt as to the person’s status, they must “enjoy the
protection of the [Third] Convention until such time as their status has been
determined by a competent tribunal.”41
While some states did not accept the proposal for a court during the
drafting negotiations, the term “competent tribunal” was used in Article 5 to
prevent a single person from being the sole arbiter for determining an

37.

ICRC Protocol, supra note 29, at § IV, art. 75(3).

38.

Id. at § III, art. 75.

39.
President Obama, for example, declared this article to be binding on the United States as
customary international law. WHITE HOUSE, Fact Sheet, supra note 12. As a reminder, customary law
is formed when there is created by looking at state practice and opinion juris (i.e. a sense of legal
obligation). André da Rocha Ferreira et. al., Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law,
UFRGSMUN | UFRGS MODEL U.N. J. 182, 183 (2013).
40.

GC III, supra note 29, at art. 5.

41.
Pictet, Commentary III, supra note 22, at art. 5, 77. This would appear quite
straightforward, but in fact, the notion of what constitutes a “competent tribunal” for initial review was a
matter of great debate at the diplomatic conference for drafting the Geneva Conventions. According to
Jean Pictet, who was present during the drafting and negotiation of the 1949 Conventions, there was
some debate over whether the term “responsible authority” or “military tribunal” would be more
appropriate. Some at the diplomatic conference thought that such a serious decision should “not be left
to a single person” but should be decided by a court. Id.
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individual’s status.42 States have implemented this provision in a number
of ways, but general practice suggests that an Article 5 Tribunal consists of
a certain number of commissioned officers (typically three to five), which
may include a military lawyer or judge. 43 The initial review carried out in
cases of doubt by an Article 5 Tribunal is particularly significant as POWs
are also not entitled to periodic reviews of their detention, although they
must “be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active
hostilities.”44
Unlike combatants, civilians may only be interned in an IAC “if the
security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary” 45 and are
provided an opportunity to challenge the necessity of any deprivation
before a court or an administrative board.46 Article 43 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention (GC IV) states that, “[a]ny protected person who has
been interned or placed in assigned residence shall be entitled to have such
action reconsidered as soon as possible by an appropriate court or
administrative board designated by the Detaining Power for that purpose.” 47
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Commentaries to
GC IV emphasize that the main protection for civilian internees is that they
“should be absolutely free to make their appeals and that the authorities
should examine them with absolute objectivity and impartiality.” 48
42.

Id. at art. 5, par. 2.

43.
David Turns et. al., Classification, Administration, and Treatment of Battlefield Detainees,
in COUNTERTERRORISM: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 426, 448–51 (Ana Maria Salinas de
Frias et. al. eds., 2012). For more information on state practice in this area, see generally id.
44.
GC III, supra note 29, at art. 118. In addition to the Article 5 tribunals, GC III provides
for Mixed Medical Commissions (MMCs) to determine whether wounded or sick POWs must be
repatriated or held in a neutral country for health reasons. Id. at art.112. The types of wounded and sick
POWs that qualify are listed in Article 110 of GC III, but generally those that must be repatriated are
those with the most serious cases of mental or physical suffering, and those who may be accommodated
in a neutral country are those whose condition requires accommodation outside of the context of
captivity to ensure a “more certain and speedy recovery.” Id. at art.110. Article 112 sets out the
requirement for an MMC to review these cases, but the composition and procedures are laid out in far
greater detail in Annex II to GC III. Art. 1 of Annex II requires that the “Mixed Medical Commissions
provided for in Article 112 of the Convention shall be composed of three members, two of whom shall
belong to a neutral country, the third being appointed by the Detaining Power.” Id. at Annex II, art. 1.
Article 6 of Annex II recommends that the two neutral members be medical professionals, namely a
surgeon and a general practitioner. Id. at Annex II, art. 6. In addition to the composition of MMCs, the
regulations are clear that these bodies must be set up immediately “upon the outbreak of hostilities.”
GC III, supra note 29, at art. 112. This is to ensure that they are functioning before the wounded and
sick begin to arrive to POW camps or hospitals. Id.
45.

GC IV, supra note 13, at art. 42.

46.

Id.

47.

Id. at art. 43.

48.

Pictet, Commentary IV, supra note 29, at art. 43.
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Like Article 5 tribunals for POWs, the initial review for civilians
interned in an IAC is not automatic. 49 As with Article 5 tribunals, the state
may choose whether to permit access to either a regular court or an
administrative board, which must offer “the necessary guarantees of
independence and impartiality” and be comprised of more than one
official.50 If a civilian internee challenges their internment, “the court or
administrative board must examine it at the earliest possible moment.” 51
However, there is no further mention of procedure in Article 43 of GC IV
with respect to how the initial review should be conducted, and thus the
composition and procedures are largely left to states to determine.52
Civilians may also be interned in occupied territory 53 under procedures
essentially identical to Article 43 of GC IV. 54

3.

Periodic Review Mechanisms in IACs

Since POWs are not entitled to any kind of periodic review under IHL,
periodic reviews only exist for civilian internees under GC IV. 55 Both
Article 43 of GC IV and Article 78 of GC IV require periodic reviews of
internment, which are automatic “appeals” of the initial determination of
internment.56 While the civilian internee must proactively seek the initial
review, he or she is entitled to automatic, regular reviews if the initial
challenge failed.57 Periodic reviews are, thus, only available to civilian
internees that have initially challenged their detention.58
49.

Id.

50.

Id.

51.

Id.

52.

Id.

53.
“Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the
hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established
and can be exercised.” Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 42, Oct. 18,
1907, 187 CTS 227; Tristan Ferraro, Determining the Beginning and End of an Occupation Under
International Humanitarian Law, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 133, 133–34 (2012).
54.
Article 78 of the GC IV refers to a “regular procedure” that must be “in accordance with
the provisions of the present Convention.” GC IV, supra note 13, at art. 78.
55.
The Mixed Medical Commissions are supposed to visit the POW camps periodically,
generally every six months, but it is not clear whether they are required to review only new cases or to
also re-examine old cases. Pictet, Commentary III, supra note 22, at art. 112, 527; see also ICRC,
Internment in Armed Conflict, supra note 26 at 5.
56.

GC IV, supra note 13, at art. 43, 78.

57.

Pictet, Commentary IV, supra note 29, at art. 43.

58.
The initial review could in theory be made by the same administrative board, or by a
judicial body, depending on the setup of the domestic system. Id.
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Under Article 43, an administrative board should reconsider cases “at
least twice yearly” due to the rapid “progress of events” likely to occur
during wartime. 59 In theory this could be the same board that made the
initial decision to intern. The provision adds that the Board should look
“favorably” at the appeal but does not give any information on a particular
burden of proof or other indication of how the review should be
conducted.60 Furthermore, the Pictet Commentary only suggests that it
would be an “advantage . . . if States Party to the Convention afford better
safeguards (examination of cases at more frequent intervals, or the setting
up of a higher appeal court).”61
The provision for periodic reviews under Article 78 of GC IV is
essentially the same, except that instead of requiring a review “at least
twice yearly”, it only requires review “if possible every six months.”62 This
seems to suggest that states wanted to give themselves a bit more flexibility
in occupied territories, so that even if periodic reviews are still mandatory,
their frequency is flexible enough to take into account the exigencies of
governing what may be hostile territory. The drafters clearly recognized
the obvious difference between setting up detainee reviews in a state’s own
territory and setting up detainee reviews when occupying a foreign
territory.63 Rule 99 of the ICRC’s Customary International Humanitarian
Law Study (CIHL) reaffirms compulsory periodic reviews of detention for
civilian internees in an IAC, but does not add further detail to the text and
commentaries of Articles 43 and 78. 64
In summary, initial reviews are available to all types of detainees held
in relation to an IAC, but only civilian internees enjoy periodic reviews. 65
The importance of this distinction is most apparent when discussing
periodic reviews in NIAC and considering what types of review
mechanisms should be available to those detainees, when compared to an
IAC. In other words, should NIAC detainees only be permitted to make an
initial habeas challenge, akin to the initial Article 5 challenge of a POW, or
should they be entitled to periodic review of their detention as civilians in
the model of GC IV?
59.

Id.

60.

Id.

61.

Id.

62.

Pictet, Commentary IV, supra note 29, at art. 78.

63.
ICRC REP. 27-10-1998, GENERAL PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING THE FOURTH GENEVA
CONVENTION, at 1(a) (1998) [hereinafter ICRC, Geneva].
64.
ICRC Customary IHL (CIHL), Rule 99. Arbitrary Deprivation of Liberty is ProhibitedInternational Armed Conflicts, Procedural Requirements, ICRC, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/custo
mary-ihl/eng/docs/vi_rul_rule99 (last visited Feb. 3, 2018) [hereinafter ICRC, CIHL].
65.

ICRC, Geneva, supra note 63, at 6(a).
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Independence and Impartiality

In addition to mandating the availability of detention review boards in
IAC, GC IV also makes it clear that these boards must be independent and
impartial, but the treaty does not go any further in defining these principles
in the context of an armed conflict. 66 The concepts of independence and
impartiality have been thoroughly addressed in relation to fair trial rights
under a human rights framework, but less so in the context of
administrative processes, and hardly at all in relation to administrative
processes under IHL. While all regional human rights treaties mandate that
that courts must be both impartial and independent, the exact meaning of
these terms is not defined.67 Thus, it is necessary to look at various
interpretations of these treaties, such as United Nation soft law or
international jurisprudence, to have a better understanding of how these
terms may be applied by the judiciary.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
provides in article 14(1) that “all persons shall be equal before the courts
and tribunals” and that “in the determination of any criminal charge against
him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit of law, everyone shall be
entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and
impartial tribunal established by law.” 68 What exactly is meant by
“independence” and “impartiality” and can these concepts be faithfully
applied in a battlefield setting?
The principle of judicial independence is an objective concept, and
thus is based on objective criteria.69 While there is much domestic case law
on this issue, in light of the thesis’s focus on international law, it is best to
begin with the United Nation’s Basic Principles on the Independence of the
Judiciary.70 The Basic Principles set out a number of different important
elements, but there a few key principles that will be of the most use in

66.

ICRC, CIHL, supra note 64.

67.

Id.

68.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 (entered into force on Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. The United States ratified the treaty
Sept. 8, 1992. Id. Other regional human rights treaties provide a similar rule. See also, International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14(1), 2200A (XXI), Dec. 16, 1966, O.H.C.H.R. (entered
into force on Mar. 23, 1976); see also, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 7(1), June
27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 ILM 58 (1982) (entered into force on Oct. 21, 1986);
American Convention on Human Rights, art. 8(1) July 18, 1978, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
69.
See Basic Principles of Independence of the Judiciary, Seventh United Nations Congress
on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Milan, 26 Aug. to 6 Sep. 1985, U.N.
Doc.A/Conf.121/22/Rev.1, 60. [hereinafter Basic Principles].
70.

Id. at 59.
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discussing independence as applied to periodic review boards during
NIACs.71
Basic Principle 1 states “[t]he independence of the judiciary shall be
guaranteed by the State and enshrined in the Constitution or the law of the
country . . . [i]t is the duty of all governmental and other institutions to
respect and observe the independence of the judiciary.” 72 Basic Principle 3
states “[t]he judiciary shall have jurisdiction over all issues of a judicial
nature and shall have exclusive authority to decide whether an issue
submitted for its decision is within its competence as defined by law.” 73
Basic Principle 4 prohibits “inappropriate or unwarranted interference with
the judicial process[.]”74 Finally, Basic Principles 10, 11, and 12 work
together to ensure that judges have “appropriate training or qualifications in
law”, and are adequately remunerated and given terms and tenure “secured
by law.”75
As demonstrated by the Basic Principles, the principle of
independence is more about structure or “institutional design” and reflects
objective criteria such as “financial and job security.” 76 As noted in Basic
Principles 10 to 12, the other side of independence is the requirement that
judges possess “a solid understanding of the law, as well as experience with
the task of adjudication.”77 The Canadian Supreme Court has described
judicial independence as based on the relationship between institutions (i.e.
the executive and judiciary) and individuals (i.e. between the judge and
executive).78
While financial and job security are some of the aspects to
independence, the independence of judicial decision making is one
necessary aspect worth highlighting, as it is essential to discussing the
independence of review boards in later sections. This concept is briefly
mentioned in Basic Principle 1, which refers to the need for other
government institutions to respect the independence of the judiciary.79 The
underlying concept is that “the Executive, the Legislature, as well as other
authorities, such as the police, prison, social and educational authorities,
71.

Id. at 60.

72.

Id.

73.

Id.

74.

Basic Principles, supra note 69, at 60.

75.

Id. at 61.

76.
(2007).

Diane M. Amann, Punish or Surveil, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 873, 900

77.

Id. at 901.

78.

Valente v. The Queen [1985] S.C.R. 673 (Can.).

79.

Basic Principles, supra note 69, at 60.
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must respect and abide by the judgements and decisions of the Judiciary,
even when they do not agree with them.” 80 The right of the judiciary to
make a binding decision that other governmental authorities must respect
will be referred to in this article as “the right to order release”.81
On the other hand, the principle of judicial impartiality is generally
viewed as a more subjective concept under international law, although there
are objective elements.82 Basic Principle 2 mandates that a judge must be
free to “decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in
accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences,
inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any
quarter or for any reason.”83
The Human Rights Committee (HRC) has opined on the nature of
impartiality at least with respect to the meaning of Article 14(1) of the
ICCPR.84 The HRC stated in Arvo O. Karttunen v. Finland that impartiality
“implies that judges must not harbor preconceptions about the matter put
before them, and that they must not act in ways that promote the interests of
one of the parties.”85 Likewise in the Valente case, the Canadian Supreme
Court referred to impartiality as “a state of mind or attitude of the tribunal
in relation to the issues and the parties in a particular case.” 86
Of immediate relevance to this discussion of the PRBs is the African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights decision in the Constitutional
Rights Project, where it found a violation of article 7(1)(d) of the Charter
merely because there were military personnel sitting along with a judge on
Nigeria’s Special Tribunal. 87 The Commission found that the composition
of the Special Tribunal “alone create[d] the appearance, if not actual lack,
of impartiality.” 88 The composition of a judicial body could represent one
of the more objective indicators of impartiality, even if the judges/decision80.
OHCHR & Int’l Bar Association, Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A
Manual on Human Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers, PROF. TRAINING SERIES No. 9, 1, 121
(2003), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training9chapter4en.pdf.
81.

Id.

82.

Id. at 120.

83.

Basic Principles, supra note 69, at 60; Amann, supra note 76, at 902.

84.
See generally U.N. doc. GAOR, A/48/40 (vol. II) U.N. Communication No. 387/1989,
Arvo O. Karttunen v. Finland (Views adopted on Oct. 23, 1992).
85.

Id. at 120.

86.

Valente v. The Queen [1985] S.C.R. 673 (Can.).

87.
Constitutional Rights Project v. Nigeria, Comm. No. 87/93, African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.]. ¶ 5 (1995), http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa
/comcases/87-93.html.
88.

Id. at ¶ 14.
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makers themselves do not have a personal bias.89
The issue of
independence and impartiality of the PRBs will be discussed further in Part
IV.

5.

Prohibition Against Self-incrimination?

The protection against self-incrimination is a well-settled principle of
law, including under IHL. 90 Article 75(4)(f) AP I, which is generally
considered to be a rule of customary law, 91 states that “no one shall be
compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt.” 92 Under United
States domestic law, this right is enshrined by the Fifth Amendment, but
this right has been held to only apply if such statements are going to be
used or are used in criminal proceedings. 93 Thus, the application of the
Fifth Amendment to a non-criminal, administrative setting like that of the
PRB, is far less clear and beyond the scope of this paper to resolve.
Nonetheless, it is worth flagging in light of the practical implications it has
in a detainee’s determination whether and to what extent to participate in
the PRBs. A few suggestions on how to practically remove this issue from
the debate are offered in Part IV.
Periodic Reviews of Internment in Non-International Armed Conflicts
As the black letter law of NIAC does not mention detention review or
any right to challenge detention, this section must examine other sources of
law including customary IHL on the right to challenge detention and review
mechanisms in the context of NIAC.94 The vast majority of practice in this
area has taken place in the past decade—with the emergence of long-term
NIAC detention by western states in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, and
89.

See, e.g., Daktaras v. Lithuania, App. No. 42095/98, ¶ 31 Eur. Ct. H.R.

90.
See, e.g., Practice Relating to Rule 100. Fair Trial Guarantees (Section J. Compelling
accused persons to testify against themselves or to confess guilt), Int’l Comm’n H.R., https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule100_sectionj.
91.

See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE, Fact Sheet, supra note 12.

92.

ICRC Protocol, supra note 29, at art. 75(4)(f).

93.
The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall be compelled . . . in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.” U.S. CONST. AMEND. V. But see Entzi v. Redmann, 485 F.3d 998, 1002 (8th Cir. 2007) (“the
general rule is that a person has no claim for civil liability based on the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee
against compelled self-incrimination unless compelled statements are admitted against him in a criminal
case …”).
94.
Int’l Comm. Red Cross [ICRC], Expert Meeting on Procedural Safeguards for Security
Detention in Non-International Armed Conflict, 6, 15 (Sept. 22–23, 2008), https://www.icrc.org/eng
/assets/files/other/security-detention-chatham-icrc-report-091209.pdf.
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Guantanamo, as well as the increase in the (usually) short-term detention by
international peacekeepers—so, it should not come as a surprise that this
custom is not yet clear.95 Because customary IHL appears to be undecided
with respect to periodic review mechanisms, this section also examines
IHRL to determine whether that body of law provides additional rules that
could be applied instead of or alongside customary IHL during NIAC.
Alternatively, in the absence of any clear rules of customary IHL or IHRL,
this paper also addresses whether IAC rules could be applied by analogy.
Rule 99 of the ICRC’s CIHL Study provides mandatory initial reviews
of detention in NIAC but does not discuss periodic reviews. 96 There is very
little written about the obligation, composition or comportment of detention
review boards in NIACs (or in IACs, for that matter). Lawrence HillCawthorne’s seminal work on detention rules in NIACs provides a detailed
overview of procedural guarantees under both IHL and IHRL.97 However,
the section on internment reviews—including both initial and periodic
reviews—is notably brief, albeit providing a number of helpful
observations.98 He compares Article 43 and 78 of GC IV, but finds that
even in IACs, “procedures to be followed by the review bodies are not
prescribed.” 99 He notes that initial reviews must: i) take place as soon as
possible after the person is detained, and ii) the reviewing body must be a
“board,” not a “single person.” 100 Otherwise, he finds no particular
requirements about the composition of the review board, the right to be
represented or call witnesses, or the “standard of review to be applied.” 101
The ICRC determined that certain procedural safeguards are required
in any form of security or administrative detention setting which takes place
in armed conflict, based on both the spirit and purpose of IHL and human
rights norms.102
ICRC guidelines on Procedural Safeguards in

95.
See generally Miles P. Fischer, Applicability of the Geneva Conventions to “Armed
Conflict” in the War on Terror, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 3 (2006); Bruce Oswald, The Copenhagen
Principles, International Military Operations and Detentions, J. OF INT’L PEACEKEEPING, Vol. 17, 116,
117 (2013), available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2478519.
96.

ICRC, CIHL, supra note 64.

97.
See generally LAWRENCE HILL-CAWTHORNE, DETENTION IN NON-INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICT (Oxford University Press 2016).
98.

See id.

99.

Id. at 53.

100.

Id. at 53–54.

101.

Id.

102. Jelena Pejic, Procedural Principles and Safeguards for Internment/Administrative
Detention in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence, Violence, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS,
388–89 (2005).
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Internment/Administrative Detention set out the standards applicable for
periodic reviews of detention.103
The purpose of the periodical review is to ascertain whether the
detainee continues to pose a real threat to the security of the
detaining power and to order release if that is not the case. All
the safeguards that apply to the initial review must apply to the
periodical review(s) as well, which, among other things, means
that the review has to be effective and must be conducted by an
independent and impartial body . . . Internment/administrative
detention will in practice be regulated by the domestic law of the
State involved in a non-international armed conflict or other
situation of violence, meaning that a person’s ability to challenge
the lawfulness of his or her internment/administrative detention
will be regulated by those norms. If the relevant domestic law
makes no such provision, it is submitted that at least six-monthly
reviews of internment/administrative detention should be
provided for, similar to the rules applicable in international
armed conflicts. 104

The ICRC’s updated Commentary to the First Geneva Convention
(GC I) mentions the right to challenge the lawfulness of detention in NIAC
before an independent and impartial review board in its revised
commentary on Common Article 3.105 It recognizes that, “the review of
lawfulness of internment must be carried out by an independent and
impartial body.”106 “Where internment review is administrative rather than
judicial in nature, ensuring the requisite independence and impartiality of
the review body will require particular attention.” 107
While these interpretations are highly regarded and often quoted by
the international legal community, they represent ICRC’s—not states’—
views about procedural safeguards for internment or administrative
103.

Id. at 388.

104.

Id. at 388–89.

105. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, construed in ICRC, Commentary to Common Article 3 of the First
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in
the Field, ¶ 722–23 (1960) [hereinafter ICRC, Commentary of 2016, Article 3].
106.

Id. at ¶ 723.

107.

Id.

The guidelines also provide for the right to periodical review of the lawfulness of continued
internment. Periodical review obliges the detaining authority to ascertain whether the detainee
continues to pose an imperative threat to security and to order release if that is not the case. The
safeguards that apply to initial review are also to be applied at periodical review. Id. at ¶ 724.
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detention.108 The ICRC itself admits that the rules are still not as clear as
they would like, recognizing that “the question of which standards and
safeguards are required in NIAC to prevent arbitrariness is still subject to
debate and needs further clarification, in part linked to unresolved issues on
the interplay between international humanitarian law and international
human rights law.”109 However, as noted in the 2005 ICRC Procedural
Safeguards guidelines:
The reason for outlining the procedural principles and safeguards
that govern internment/administrative detention is that although
this type of deprivation of liberty is often practised in both
international and non-international armed conflicts and other
situations of violence, the protection of the rights of the persons
affected by it is insufficiently elaborated. 110

At the time, the ICRC based the majority of its arguments about basic
procedural guarantees in administrative detention on some combination of
legal provisions identified in GC IV, Article 75 of AP I, and/or human
rights law.111 Under the rules of IAC, the ICRC acknowledged that states
are given the choice between courts and administrative review boards for
the initial detention challenge.112 However, for NIACs, the ICRC asserted
that:
[H]uman rights law and jurisprudence applicable to situations of
non-international armed conflict or other situations of violence
unequivocally require that challenges to the lawfulness of
internment/administrative detention be heard by a court. Under
the ICCPR, anyone deprived of liberty is entitled to take
proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide
without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his
release if the detention is not lawful. 113

The requirement for a judicial hearing would seem to be with respect
to the initial right to challenge one’s detention, but some states have not
signed up to the applicable human rights treaties or have interpreted their

108.

Id. at ¶ 725.

109.

Id.

110.

Pejic, supra note 102, at 376.

111.

See generally ICRC Protocol, supra note 29, at art. 75.

112.

Pejic, supra note 102, at 387.

113.

Id.
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obligations differently. 114 However, even if one accepts that judicial review
of detention in NIAC is a non-derogable right under IHRL, it does not
answer the question of whether periodic reviews are also required.
The ICRC is not alone in trying to establish the necessity of periodic
review mechanisms for NIAC detention. Ashley Deeks, a United States
expert on the laws of war, argues that the “core procedures contained in the
Fourth Geneva Convention are battle-tested and serve as an excellent basis
for administrative detention during all types of armed conflict.” 115 IHL
provides a “near-term ability to challenge that detention before a court or an
administrative board (at the choice of the state)” in part because IHL
recognizes that mistakes are easy to make on the battlefield.116 In other
words, detention in NIAC should “require the state to immediately review
that detention, permit the detainee to appeal the initial detention decision,
require the state to review the detention periodically, and obligate the state
to release the detainee when the reasons for his detention have ceased.” 117
However, Deeks recognizes that rules for internment review, even under
GC IV, are vague at best. 118
Regardless of whether the right to challenge detention before a judicial
body is a non-derogable right during peacetime and armed conflict, states
have acknowledged the need for periodic, administrative review boards. 119
In light of the particular challenges of coalition warfare in extraterritorial
NIACs (e.g. Afghanistan and Iraq), twenty-four states came together to
create a body of non-binding guidelines for these types of situations—The
Copenhagen Process Principles and Guidelines.120 In its preamble, it is
114. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, for example, has said that the writ of habeas
corpus does not to apply extraterritorially to non-citizens. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 99
(D.C. Cir. 2010).
115. Ashley Deeks, Security Detention: The International Legal Framework: Administrative
Detention in Armed Conflict, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 403, 405 (2009).
116.

Id.

117. Id. at 408. Deeks also asserts that IHL is more suited to battlefield detention than IHRL in
part because it allows for some flexibility in wartime conditions. See id. at 408–09.
118.

Id. at 409–10.

119. Arguments for why periodic reviews are needed even when judicial review is present is
made in the next section.
120. The Copenhagen Process on the Handling of Detainees in International Military
Operations, ¶ I (Oct. 19, 2012), https://erasmusmais.pt/uploads/files/references/copenhangen_process590ccac4a79a8.pdf [hereinafter Copenhagen Process]. These twenty-four states are: Argentina,
Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, India, Malaysia, New
Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, Tanzania, the Netherlands, Turkey,
Uganda, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. Id. Additionally, the following nonstate actors participated: the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), the United Nations (UN), and the ICRC. Id.

2018]

Harrison

561

described as “intended to apply to international military operations in the
context of non-international armed conflicts and peace operations; they are
not intended to address international armed conflicts.” 121 The Copenhagen
Guidelines reflect the understanding of many states that NIAC detention in
an extraterritorial conflict is not necessarily subject to judicial review, but
that detainees should be able to challenge their detention before a
competent body.122 Principle 12 of the Copenhagen Guidelines states that,
“[a] detainee whose liberty has been deprived for security reasons is to, in
addition to a prompt initial review, have the decision to detain reconsidered
periodically by an impartial and objective authority that is authorized to
determine the lawfulness and appropriateness of continued detention.” 123
While the Copenhagen Guidelines do not represent a legal authority, they
reflect emerging state practice on the issue.
In conclusion, there is no treaty-based rule, nor does there appear to be
a customary rule of IHL on periodic reviews for NIAC detention, although
there is some indication that this norm could be slowly emerging based on
state practice. The next section looks at whether IHRL, which applies at all
times, requires periodic reviews in addition to any initial judicial reviews
IHLR would require.
Periodic Reviews of Internment Under International Human Rights
Law
Security or administrative detention in relation to an armed conflict is
generally frowned upon under most IHRL regimes, but is not prohibited
outright, although it may require derogation, at least from certain regional
treaty regimes like the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).124 The
starting point for security detention under IHRL comes from the ICCPR
and corresponding rulings or opinions by the Human Rights Committee
(HRC). According to the HRC:

121.

Id. at 1.

122.

Id. at 2.

123.

Id. at 4.

124.

See id.
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if so-called preventive detention is used, for reasons of public
security . . . it must not be arbitrary, and must be based on
grounds and procedures established by law . . . information of the
reasons must be given . . . and court control of the detention must
be available . . . as well as compensation in the case of a
breach.125

Where security detention is used, however, IHRL requires that
detainees be given the opportunity to challenge their detention before a
judicial body, and at least the HRC has stipulated that this right is nonderogable.126
Claire Macken’s often-quoted and comprehensive analysis of
preventive detention under the ICCPR provides a useful overview of
procedural guarantees for security detention under IHRL and discusses the
fundamental right to challenge security detention under the ICCPR. 127
According to Macken, detainees must have the right to challenge their
detention before a competent body, which is normally read to mean the
right to habeas corpus.128 Nonetheless, in looking at the travaux
preparatoire, it seems “the reference to habeas corpus was deleted in order
to specify that states must be free to allow for such a right of appeal within
the framework of their own legal systems.”129
While IHRL may not directly provide for periodic administrative
review boards, some human rights courts entertain the notion of them in the
context of IACs.130 The ECHR, for example, accepted that frequent
periodic reviews by a “competent body” for civilian internees in IAC could
be compatible with Article 5 of the ECHR, so long as the body provides
“sufficient guarantees of impartiality and fair procedure to protect against

125. U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC), General Comment no. 8, Art. 9 (16th Sess., 1982),
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty
Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 1 at 8, ¶ 4 (1994).
126. ICCPR, supra note 68, at art. 9 (4); U.N. Hum. Rts. Committee (HRC), General Comment
no. 29, Art. 4, States of Emergency, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001), ¶11.
127. Claire Macken, Preventative Detention and the Right of Personal Liberty and Security
Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, 26 ADELAIDE L. REV. 1, 27
(2005).
128.

Id. at 24.

129. Id. (quoting MARC J. BOSSUYT, GUIDE TO THE ‘TRAVAUX PRÉPATORIES’ OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 213 (1987)).
130. See id. at 8–9 (noting that some human rights courts, like the Nato-led Kosovo Force
(KFOR), follows the notion of administrative review boards).
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arbitrariness.” 131 The United Kingdom Supreme Court has also posited that
periodic reviews may be appropriate in certain circumstances where habeas
is impracticable.132
Therefore, one can conclude that while IHRL may not directly provide
for periodic reviews in IACs, it does not exclude them. 133 For example, in
Rameka v. New Zealand, the HRC held that:
While preventive detention for the purpose of protecting the
public against dangerous criminals is not prohibited as such
under the Covenant and its imposition sometimes cannot be
avoided, it must be subject to the strictest procedural safeguards,
as provided for in article 9 of the Covenant, including the
possibility for periodic review, by a court, of the continuing
lawfulness of such detention. Such reviews are necessary as any
human person has the potential to change and improve, i.e. to
become less dangerous over time (e.g. as a consequence of inner
growth or of a successful therapy, or as a result of an ailment
reducing his physical abilities to commit a specific category of
crimes).134

It is even less clear with NIACs as there is no IHL treaty provision on
which IHRL bodies can rely, and IHRL does not provide any explicit treaty
basis for periodic reviews of the legality of detention, at least in the sense of
NIAC detention reviews. 135 Nonetheless, the HRC “has held that detention
which may have initially been legal may become arbitrary if it is unduly
prolonged or not subject to periodic review.” 136 At least some forms of
periodic review of administrative detention (e.g. immigration detention)
appear to be part of the fundamental guarantees needed to protect against

131. Vaios Koutroulis, Proceedings of the Bruges Colloquium: Detention in Armed Conflict,
15th Bruges Colloquium Oct. 16–17, 2014 (quoting Hassan v. UK, App No 29750/09, Judgment, 45
(Grand Chamber), Sept. 16, 2014).
132.

See Serdar Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence (2017) UKSC 2, at 103.

133. “There is no specified periodicity of review available to persons detained in noninternational armed conflicts or other situations of violence, because human rights law does not limit the
frequency of challenges that may be submitted by an interned/administratively detained person to the
lawfulness of detention (habeas corpus petitions).” See Pejic, supra note 102, at 388–99.
134. Rameka v. New Zealand, CCPR/C/79/D/1090/2002 (2003), individual opinion of
Committee member Mr. Walter Kälin (dissenting in part).
135.

See ICRC, Internment in Armed Conflict, supra note 26, at 1, 6.

136. Submission to the U.N. Hum. Rts. Committee (HRC), General comment no. 35, Art. 9
(109th Sess. 14 Oct.–1 Nov. 2013), Liberty and Security of the Person, for the Consideration of the U.N.
Human Rights Committee, Geneva, EQUAL RTS TRUST 1, 9 Oct. 2013.
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arbitrary detention. 137 Therefore, HRC jurisprudence would at least seem to
accept the necessity of periodic reviews if security detention takes place.
Dissenting in the Rameka case, Mr. Kalin considered that “the
compulsory annual reviews of detention” by the Parole Board, which were
“subject to judicial review in the High Court and Court of Appeal,” may
have met the standard of non-arbitrariness with respect to detention since
the detention had been subject to “regular periodic reviews of the individual
case by an independent body.” 138 However, with little additional IHRL
case law on the subject of periodic reviews, and almost no case law on
periodic review for security or NIAC detention, it is difficult to determine
how bodies like the HRC would interpret a requirement to have periodic
reviews by an administrative, rather than a judicial, body.
Habeas petitions, or their equivalent, are generally available at any
time under IHRL, so there is no particular periodicity attached. 139
However, a typical habeas petition is intended to challenge the lawfulness
of detention and must be proactively brought by the petitioner. 140 Regular,
periodic administrative reviews of detention may serve the same purpose of
challenging the lawfulness of detention (or in some systems, the continued
“need” for detention even if such detention is per se lawful), but they
should at least in theory be faster and less burdensome than a full-blown
court proceeding, and should be automatic in nature. Furthermore, IHRL
does not take into account the battlefield context, where access to habeas
courts (particularly if the courts sit in a third state) may prove to be
logistically impossible or at least far less efficient than an on-site
administrative review board. 141
Thus, while IHRL may not specifically provide for periodic review
boards in NIAC, it does not exclude them and in very narrow circumstances
may consider them an appropriate alternative when there is no access to
judicial proceedings.142

137. Alfred de Zayas, Human Rights and Indefinite Detention, 87 INT’L. REV. RED CROSS 15,
17–18, 29 (2005).
138.

Rameka, CCPR/C/79/D/1090/2002 ¶ 7.3.

139. Brian Farrell, Habeas Corpus in International Law 3 (May 4, 2014) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, National University of Ireland, Galway); see Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 99 (D.C.
Cir. 2010).
140. Farrell, supra note 139, at 2, 157; ICRC, CIHL, supra note 64; Richard Nicholson,
Functionalism ’s Military Necessity Problem: Extraterritorial Habeas Corpus, Justice Kennedy,
Boumediene v. Bush, and Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1393, 1399 (2012).
141.

Farrell, supra note 139, at 290–91.

142.

ICRC, Internment in Armed Conflict, supra note 26, at 2.
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Periodic Reviews of Internment Under United States’ Domestic Law
Since the PRBs were established by executive order, their existence is
a matter of policy and can be overturned in an instant, and PRBs are not
available to any United States law-of-war detainees outside of Guantanamo,
so it is important to examine United States’ domestic law on the issue of
periodic reviews.143 While there is no explicit domestic legislation
requiring periodic reviews in relation to any armed conflict or security
detention, the Department of Defense Law of War Manual (DoD LOW
Manual) sets out a framework for establishing reviews in detention
operations carried out by the Department of Defense (DoD).144
For IACs, DoD clearly follows the provisions of GC IV. According to
§ 10.9.2.3, civilian internees:
[S]hall be entitled to have such action reconsidered as soon as
possible by an appropriate court or administrative board
designated by the Detaining Power for that purpose. If the
internment or placement in assigned residence is maintained, the
court or administrative board shall periodically, and at least twice
yearly, give consideration to his or her case, with a view to the
favorable amendment of the initial decision, if circumstances
permit.145

With respect to persons detained in NIACs or to “unprivileged
belligerents,” the DoD LOW Manual reflects its own practice rather than
binding legal norms, and permits “unprivileged belligerents” to be detained
until the end of hostilities.146 However, it also notes “DoD practice has
been to review periodically the detention of all persons not afforded POW
status or treatment.”147 Section 8.14.2 reflects additional DoD practice for
persons detained for “security reasons” but not designated as “unprivileged
belligerents.” 148 For these individuals, DoD notes that the practice “is to
have, in addition to a prompt initial review, the decision to detain
reconsidered periodically by an impartial and objective authority that is
143. See Executive Order No. 13567, 76 Fed. Reg. 13,277 (Mar. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Exec.
Order No. 13567].
144. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, Department of Defense Law of War Manual, ¶ 10.9.2.3 (June
2015) [hereinafter DOD Law of War Manual] (the Manual does not represent binding law, but it reflects
the Department of Defense’s interpretation of the laws of war).
145.

Id.

146.

Id. at ¶ 4.19.3.4.

147.

Id.

148.

Id. at ¶ 8.14.2.
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authorized to determine the lawfulness and appropriateness of continued
detention.”149 The review board could be either military or civilian in
nature.150
This section also suggests that reviews may not be every six months,
but would:
depend on a variety of factors, including: (1) operational
necessities or resource constraints, such as force protection, the
availability of interpreters, or large numbers of detainees; (2) the
thoroughness of the review process; and (3) whether there is a
true prospect that the legal or factual predicates justifying
detention have changed. 151

In keeping with IHL, the DoD LOW Manual accepts that “such
persons shall be released with the minimum delay possible and in any event
as soon as the circumstances justifying the arrest, detention, or internment
have ceased to exist.”152 However, the DoD LOW Manual also recognizes
that “[a]s a matter of policy, release of lawfully detained persons often
occurs before the conclusion of hostilities.” 153
In conclusion, there is no clearly binding rule of international or
domestic law providing for periodic reviews of NIAC detention.
Nonetheless, it would appear from emerging customary norms, IHRL, and
the spirit and purpose of IHL, that detainees held in relation to NIAC must
be permitted to challenge their detention periodically in order to prevent it
from being, or becoming, arbitrary in nature. The preference will always be
that such challenges take place before a court, at least initially. Regardless,
periodic reviews should be regularly and automatically provided to prevent
detention from becoming arbitrary in nature, since such detainees have not
been charged or convicted as part of a criminal proceeding.
III.

PERIODIC REVIEWS FOR GUANTANAMO DETAINEES

The United States is by far the greatest promoter of ad hoc
administrative reviews of security or NIAC detention. 154 The United States
has tried, adapted, re-launched, and settled upon numerous variations of
149.

DoD Law of War Manual, supra note 144, at ¶ 8.14.2.

150.

Id. at ¶ 8.14.2.

151.

Id.

152.

Id. at ¶ 8.14.3.

153.

Id. at ¶ 8.14.3.1.

154. This article will refer to “security detention” or “NIAC detention” interchangeably. Any
use of the term “security detention” refers to administrative detention in relation to an armed conflict
and subject to LOAC rules.
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these reviews in Guantanamo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.155 The scope of this
article does not permit an in-depth analysis of each past process, but some
background is needed to understand the evolution of the detention review
processes in the United States. 156
Legal Status of Guantanamo Detainees
The majority of Guantanamo detainees were captured in relation to the
conflict in Afghanistan. 157 However, the classification of that conflict, and
therefore the status of the detainees, has never been straightforward. Most
IHL scholars consider the conflict in Afghanistan to have been an IAC
between the United States and the Taliban from the commencement of
active hostilities on October 7, 2001, until the election of Hamid Karzai by
the Loya Jirga on June 19, 2002. 158 This means that those Guantanamo
detainees captured in that period should have received protected status as
either POWs under GC III or as civilian internees under GC IV. Initially,
the United States government did not acknowledge the existence of an IAC,
and at one point even refused to apply the rules of NIAC. 159 However, the

155. See generally Thomas B. Nachbar, Executive Branch Policy Meets International Law in
the Evolution of the Domestic Law of Detention, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 201 (2013).
156. It is also important to note that the United States uses a bifurcated system separating the
grounds for detention and the imperative security threat posed by NIAC detainees. Geneva Convention
I Wounded and Sick in the Field, Introduction, B(1)(f), Aug. 12, 1949; see also, Eric Talbot Jensen,
Applying a Sovereign Agency Theory of the Law of Armed Conflict, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 685, 692 (2012).
In practice this means that in the United States and in Guantanamo, any initial challenge to the
lawfulness of detention is subject to federal habeas review. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., About the Periodic
Review Board, PERIODIC REV. SECRETARIAT, http://www.prs.mil/About-the-PRB/ (last visited Jan. 18,
2018) [hereinafter DOD, About the Periodic Review Board]. The initial grounds for detention is
confirmed by a federal civilian court when challenged by a detainee, whereas the security threat and
necessity of continued detention is examined by an administrative board. Cong. Research Serv.,
R40139, 3, 12 (2011). In all other contexts, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, the legal and threat
bifurcation remains in theory, but detainees are not entitled to habeas challenges, and thus may only
challenge the need for continued detention by demonstrating to an administrative board that they do not
(or no longer) pose a threat to security. David G. Savage & Christi Parsons, Court: No habeas Rights
for Prisoners in Afghanistan, LOS ANGELES TIMES (May 21, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/
print/2010/may/21/nation/la-na-court-bagram-20100522.
157. Joy Olson, WASH. OFFICE ON LATIN AM., Guantanamo Fact Sheet, Background, ¶ 6 (Dec.
5, 2014), https://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/WOLA%20General/Guantanamo%20
Fact%20Sheet.pdf.
158. See, e.g., Robin Geiss & Michael Siegrist, Has the Armed Conflict in Afghanistan Affected
the Rules on the Conduct of Hostilities?, 93 INT’L REV. RED CROSS, 11 (2011).
2002),

159. See, e.g., Application of Treaties and Laws to Al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, (Jan. 22,
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2009/08/24/memo-laws-taliban-detainees.
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United States’ Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld held the conflict in
which Guantanamo detainees had been captured was at the very least a
NIAC governed by Common Article 3. 160 Since NIACs provide no clear
status or special protections, unlike those found for POWs, detainees in
Guantanamo are left with very little black letter law on which to rely. 161 To
add to the uncertainty, the United States has treated individuals captured in
Afghanistan and transferred to Guantanamo as unprivileged enemy
belligerents, a status not found in IHL or elsewhere in international law, but
which seems to have crystallized in United States domestic law.162
The detention facility at Guantanamo is truly sui generis, both
factually and legally, so both the conditions of detention and the legal abyss
in which it exists are unlikely to be reproduced, and thus the rules or
policies that arise out of it are almost impossible to apply in a more
“normal” battlefield context. However, the United States authorities have
experimented with different kinds of security review processes, including
Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) and Administrative Review
pdf; see also, Miles P. Fischer, Applicability of the Geneva Conventions to “Armed Conflict” in the War
on Terror, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 509, 512 (2006).
160.

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 563 (2006).

161. While the text of the 2001 AUMF does reference persons participating in the 9/11 attacks
against the United States, the majority of later habeas cases do not reflect any direct connection between
those held in Guantanamo as NIAC detainees and persons who would meet the narrow criteria of
persons involved, even tangentially, in the attacks on the World Trade Center. See Hathaway et al.,
supra note 27, at 123, 125, 129, 130–31 (2013). This excludes the handful of Guantanamo detainees
specifically charged in relation to these attacks of course. Id. at 130. Later legislation, such as the
Military Commissions Act or the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2012 provided
some post-hoc guidance on status of persons in Guantanamo, but the vast majority of Guantanamo
detainees had already arrived by 2006 (and certainly by 2012), meaning the 2001 AUMF was the sole
legal basis for detaining these individuals. Cong. Research Serv., R42143, 3 (2016). As the 2006 (and
later 2009) Military Commissions Act only governs prosecution for war crimes and thus affects only a
small number of detainees held, it is reasonable to argue that there was no significant clarification of
status between the 2001 AUMF and the 2012 NDAA when Congress finally defined persons who could
be detained under the 2001 AUMF. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, H.R.
1540, 112th Cong. (2011).
162. Many articles have been written on unprivileged enemy belligerents (also known as
unlawful enemy combatants) so this paper will not dwell on this issue except to flag the terminology.
For sources supporting the notion of an “unprivileged [enemy] belligerent.” See, e.g., Kenneth Watkin,
Warriors Without Rights? Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents, and the Struggle Over Legitimacy, in
HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES 45–67 (2005); see
generally Scott Reid, Terrorists as Enemy Combatants: An Analysis of How the United States Applies
the Law of Armed Conflict in the Global War on Terrorism (Feb. 9, 2004) (unpublished manuscript)
(Naval War College). But see, Knut Dörmann, The Legal Situation of “Unlawful/Unprivileged
Combatants”, 85 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 45 (2003); Laura M. Olson, Guantanamo Habeas Review:
Are the D.C. District Court’s Decisions Consistent with IHL Internment Standards, 42 CASE W. RES.
REV. J. INT’L L. 197, 214 (2009).
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Boards (ARBs).163 There were a number of major shortcomings with these
processes, including the fact that detainees barely had any time to prepare a
defense, did not have access to private counsel, and that the final decision
to order release or transfer was not made by the Board itself. 164
Both the CSRTs and ARBs were highly criticized and were
discontinued around 2007 as new arrivals ceased. 165 Newly elected
President Obama ordered his own review of the status of detainees in
Guantanamo, which was known as the Guantanamo Review Task Force. 166
It published its findings in January 2010, but as with the previous reviews,
it was without the formal participation of detainees, and thus did not
provide the kind of review process foreseen by international law. 167
Executive Order 13567 and the Progression of PRBs from 2013-2016
When it became clear that the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility was
not going to close as promptly as planned and that habeas was not proving
to be a very expedient way for detainees to challenge their continued
detention, new procedures and policies were put in place to allow detainees
an additional means of challenging their continued detention. 168 The PRBs
were established by Executive Order 13567 (EO 13567) on March 7,
2011.169 The “Implementing Guidelines for Periodic Review of Detainees
Held at Guantanamo Bay per Executive Order 13567,” which set out the
specific procedures for these reviews, were not promulgated until May 9,
2012.170 The first PRB hearing did not take place until November 2013,171
163.

Boumedine v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 767, 785–86 (2008).

164. Thomas R. Johnson, Combatant Status Review Tribunals: An Ordeal Through the Eyes of
One “Enemy Combatant”, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 943, 947–50 (2007); see generally Brian J.
Foley, Guantanamo and Beyond: Dangers of Rigging the Rules, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 1009
(2007).
165.

Boumedine, 553 U.S. at 767, 785–86 (2008).

166. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, & JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, Final
Report: Guantanamo Review Task Force (2010).
167.

Id.

168. See generally Benjamin Wittes et. al., The Emerging Law of Detention 2.0 The
Guantánamo Habeas Cases as Lawmaking, HARV. L. SCH. NAT’L SEC. RESEARCH COMM., (Apr. 2012),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Chesney-Full-Text-Update32913.pdf (for more
information on the difficulties that habeas cases have run into with respect to Guantanamo detainees,
and the ways in which they can challenge their detentions).
169.

Exec. Order No. 13567, supra note 143, at 1377.

170. OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y OF DEF., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF,
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY: EXTENSION APPROVAL FOR DIRECTIVE-TYPE
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and the last remaining PRB-eligible detainee did not receive an initial
hearing until September 8, 2016. 172
EO 13567 established that continued detention would be mandated so
long as the concerned detainee posed a “significant” threat to the United
States.173 Each detainee is entitled to an initial full review within one
year,174 to an in-person hearing, and a file review every six months
thereafter. Every three years, the detainee is entitled to another full review
with an in-person hearing, although a file review could result in an order of
an earlier full review. 175 The PRB is comprised of members from each of
the following six agencies: Department of State, Department of Defense,
Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.176
EO 13567 also instituted procedures for a full review, and each
detainee is:177

MEMORANDUM (DTM) 12-005 “IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES FOR PERIODIC REVIEW OF DETAINEES
HELD AT GUANTANAMO BAY PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 13567 (2012) [hereinafter DOD MEMORANDUM].
171. Periodic Review Secretariat, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., http://www.prs.mil/ReviewInformation/Initial-Review/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2017) [hereinafter Periodic Review Secretariat
Statistics]; U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., Initial Review, Periodic Review Secretariat, http://www.prs.mil/ReviewInformation/Initial-Review/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2018) [hereinafter DoD, Initial Review].
172.

Periodic Review Secretariat Statistics, supra note 171.

173.

Exec. Order No. 13567, supra note 143, at 13277.

174. As noted, in practice it took approximately three to five years for a detainee to receive an
initial review. See Periodic Review Secretariat Statistics, supra note 171.
175.

Exec. Order No. 13567, supra note 143, at 13279.

176.

Id. at 13280.

177. Id. at 13277–78. The file review follows identical procedures except there is no in-person
hearing so all statements must be submitted in writing to the Board. Id. at 13279.
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i)

given advance notice of the hearing date, and is
“provided, in writing and in a language the detainee
understands” with an unclassified summary of the
reasons for continued detention; 178
ii) assigned a military personal representative (PR) and
may acquire private counsel (PC) at no cost to the
government;179
iii) permitted to make any written or oral statements,
secure the statements of witnesses (e.g., family and
home-country officials or elders), and answer any
questions that were posed by the Board itself. 180

In addition to reviewing the materials or statements provided by the
detainee and his PR/PC, the PRB also considers evidence collected and
coordinated by the DoD.181 This information is provided by multiple
agencies, including the intelligence agencies, and has undergone a review in
which all information obtained through torture is presumably removed. 182
The Board then makes a determination whether continued detention is
necessary, and all members of the Board must be in consensus. 183 If the
Board determines that detention is no longer warranted, “the PRB shall also
recommend any conditions that relate to the detainee's transfer.” 184 This
recommendation is then submitted to a Review Committee comprised of the
principals of the six different government agencies who are given thirty
days to ask for a review of the PRB’s recommendation. 185 The Review
Committee may also intervene if the Board is unable to reach a
consensus.186 This author was unable to find any direct evidence of the
Review Committee overturning a recommendation made by the Board, but
by looking at the speed in which most initial decisions were reached (i.e.,
within the 30 days in which the Board has been given to overturn a
178.

Id. at 13277.

179.

Exec. Order No. 13567, supra note 143, at 13278.

180.

Id.

181.

Id.

182. Id. The author cannot attest to the quality of this review and therefore makes no assertion
as to whether such evidence is indeed considered in the PRB review.
183.

Id.

184. In practice this has meant that the Board recommends repatriation or resettlement to a
third country. On occasion, the Board has made more specific recommendations about the preferred
third country or the need for time spent in a rehabilitation center. See Exec. Order No. 13567, supra
note 143, at 13278.
185.

Id. at 13279–80.

186.

Id.
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decision), it would seem that at least more often than not, the Review
Committee has respected the decision of the Board. 187 However, the fact
that the Board cannot order release is a serious threat to its independence,
even if the Review Committee uses this power sparingly.
In stark comparison to the “success” rate of CSRTs and ARBs, PRBs
have cleared significantly more detainees for transfer. 188 Clearing and
transferring detainees are significant factors in determining whether the
reviews are robust, because one would expect many mistakes or oversights
when individuals are detained on the “hot battlefield.” 189 The PRB
determined at least one detainee to be a case of mistaken identity and to not
have met the criteria for “unprivileged enemy belligerent,” which the
CSRTs failed to acknowledge, and many more have been determined not to
pose a significant threat to the United States or at least not a significant
enough threat to merit continued detention. 190 Of the sixty-four PRB
eligible detainees, thirty-two were cleared in their initial review and did not
have to undergo further reviews. 191 Additional detainees have been cleared
in subsequent reviews. 192
The different outcomes between PRBs and previous review processes
are hard to pinpoint, but there are a few key factors. First, evidence
obtained from torture and ill-treatment was generally omitted in the PRBs
through a CIDT (Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment) interagency

187. Periodic Review Secretariat Statistics, supra note 171. This statement is based on a
review of PRB decisions on the PRS website. See id.
188. According to the Heritage Foundation, the CSRTs conducted 572 hearings between 2004
and 2007; of those, only 38 detainees were determined not to be enemy combatants and were sent home.
See CHRIS EDELSON, POWER WITHOUT CONSTRAINT 64 (UNIV. OF WIS. PRESS, 2016); Timothy Book,
Review Process Unprecedented, 6 THE WIRE 1, 9 (Mar. 10, 2006). According to the Joint Task Force
Guantanamo Public Affairs Office, by March 2006 the ARBs had made 463 board recommendations
resulting in 14 recommendations for release, 119 recommendations for transfer (i.e. custody in a third
country), and 330 decisions for continued detention. Book, supra note 188, at 1. In contrast, 36 of the
64 PRB eligible detainees were transferred out of Guantanamo by January 2017. Guantanamo Periodic
Review Boards, HUM RTS. FIRST, https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/guantanamo-periodicreview-boards (last visited Feb. 2, 2018).
189.

See Book, supra note 188, at 9.

190. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, Guantanamo Detainee Profile, Mustafa Abd-al-Qawi Abd-alAziz al-Shamiri, (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN434/20150925_U_ISN
434_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_PUBLIC.pdf. All decisions of the PRB can
be found at www.prs.mil; see generally Carol Rosenberg, Guantanamo Periodic Rev. Guide, MIAMI
HERALD (Sept. 21, 2016), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/guantanamo
/article68333292.html (for additional breakdown of the statistics).
191.

See generally id.

192. H. Candace Gorman, Gitmo by the Numbers, THE GUANTANAMO BLOG, (Dec 23, 2016,
12:49 PM), http://gtmoblog.blogspot.com/2016/.
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review, meaning the quality of information should have improved. 193
Second, the vast majority of detainees fully participated in these hearings
alongside their PRs, translators, and often private counsel as well. 194 While
this was permitted in past processes like the ARB, detainees did not in fact
participate, so it was clearly not encouraged in the same way as it was for
the PRBs.195 The in-person hearing gave detainees an opportunity to
interact with the Board members and answer any questions posed to them.
The detainees also met regularly with their representatives before hearings
in order to be prepared. 196 One must acknowledge that the passage of time,
the aging of the detainees, and other factors may also have decreased the
perceived threat level of the detainees in the interim years. However, this
does not explain the fact that initial decisions by the PRB were overturned
by the same PRB within months and it certainly does not explain such
occurrences as the acknowledgment of mistaken identities.197
In addition to the formal differences, these differences also appear to
confirm the efficacy—if not the legitimacy—of the PRB process. The PRB
appears to approach each case in a more objective way, without a predetermined outcome in mind. 198 While this may be the result of positive
political pressure, this author argues that the process itself is more
independent and impartial than previous processes. The fact that the Board
overturned itself on multiple cases—without interference by principals or
other political actors—speaks to a high degree of de facto independence.
Also, the active (voluntary) participation of most detainees between 2013–
16 suggests that the process was perceived to be more impartial than

193. DOD MEMORANDUM, supra note 170, at 17. There have been instances where JTFGTMO assessments appear to refer to evidence. See S. Rep. No. 113-288, supra note 11, at 4; cf.
Guantanamo Detainee Profile, Mohd Farik Bin Amin (Feb. 16, 1975), http://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/
Documents/ISN10021/20160324_U_ISN_10021_GOVERNMENTS_UNCLASSIFIED_SUMMARY_
PUBLIC.pdf?ver=2016-08-08-115739-550); see S. Rep. No. 113-288, supra note 11, at 187, 203.
Despite these questionable references, there was at least an interagency process in place to review and
remove such tainted evidence. See Exec. Order No. 13567, supra note 143, at 13278.
194. Exec. Order No. 13567, supra note 143, at 13278; U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, Periodic
Review Secretariat, The Periodic Review Board, http://www.prs.mil/abou-the-prb/.
195.

See Book, supra note 188, at 1, 9; DOD MEMORANDUM, supra note 170, at 10.

196.

DOD MEMORANDUM, supra note 170, at 15.

197. See, e.g., Fact Sheet: Falsehood of Closing Guantanamo Bay, HOUSE ARMED SERVS.
COMM., https://armedservices.house.gov/sites/republicans.armedservices.house.gov/files/wysiwyg_uplo
aded/20160826_GTMO_Fact_Sheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2018).
198. This statement is based on a review of PRB decisions on the PRS website (www.prs.mil).
See DOD, About the Periodic Review Board, supra note 156.
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previous processes.199 The current attitude is unclear as most detainees are
not entitled to a full, in-person review for several years, and the de facto
stop of all transfers out of Guantanamo will certainly affect the perception
of the PRB as an independent and impartial process going forward.200
However, the lack of any protection from self-incrimination for
detainees is more likely to derail the PRBs at this stage. While it is
unsettled whether detainees may raise a Fifth Amendment claim against
self-incrimination in the context of Guantanamo, and particularly outside of
any criminal process, there is a built-in conflict in the PRB system, which
encourages detainees to “come clean” and demonstrate why they have
changed, but which does not ensure that any statements made will not be
used against them in later proceedings, whether criminal or civil in
nature.201 When there is a political will to transfer detainees, detainees and
their representatives may take the risk to participate in the process.
Nonetheless, when transfers cease, detainees will likely determine that the
honest admission of past history, encouraged by the Board, are not worth
imperiling their habeas cases or other future processes if transfer is
unlikely.
The early success of this process suggests that PRBs should be
continued if they can be sufficiently revised by the Trump administration to
better institutionalize independence and impartiality within the system.
However, even if PRBs were to be improved, they were only ever intended
for the rather small population at Guantanamo, and their complex structure
requiring cabinet-level involvement may be unworkable in a more
traditional battlefield context.202
IV.

THE FUTURE OF REVIEW PROCESSES IN GUANTANAMO AND BEYOND

As referenced in the introduction to this paper, detention may be
necessary during armed conflict, but a deprivation of liberty may also have
disastrous humanitarian or economic consequences for the individual and
the individual’s family or community. 203 There are times when a person

199.

This statement is based on a review of PRB decisions on the PRS website (www.prs.mil).

Id.
200. This is in spite of certain alleged shortcomings such as the continued use of certain
unreliable information, such as statements obtained through torture. See, e.g., Center for Constitutional
Rights, Guled Hassan Duran, (Nov. 30, 2016), https://ccrjustice.org/guled-hassan-duran.
201.
202.
note 156.
203.

See supra Part III, Section A.
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must be detained—specifically when it is militarily necessary to protect
against an imperative threat to security. 204
The overarching need for an independent judicial review to prevent
detention from becoming arbitrary is well established in international law
and jurisprudence. 205 However, while this right is essential, there are
several reasons why independent and impartial periodic reviews remain
equally necessary during armed conflict. For one, judicial review may not
be readily available in the heat of battle or in far-off military bases on
hostile terrain. This should not exclude the possibility of judicial review,
but it reinforces the necessity of appropriate, administrative reviews on a
regular basis. In addition, a judicial challenge to detention will almost
always be a long, drawn-out court proceeding, which must be initiated by
the detainee and is in most cases viewed as a one-off challenge.206 Periodic
reviews, on the other hand, when implemented correctly, should provide an
automatic and efficient procedure for regularly challenging the necessity of
detention.
So, what does this mean for PRBs in Guantanamo or other NIAC
review processes going forward? In this author’s view it means two things.
First, under international law, some kind of periodic review should be
required for any (non-POW) law-of-war detention in keeping with the spirit
and purpose of IHL. However, because the exact composition and
procedures of these boards are not well established in NIAC, it leaves wide
discretion to states to analogize to IAC rules, IHRL procedures, and other
sources. Second, while reviews are not required as a matter of United
States domestic law, long-standing and consistent United States practice
establishes that reviews are both necessary and practical tools to deal with
NIAC detention populations.207
The processes between the current PRB system and the system
provided by GC IV for civilian internees are fairly similar. Both establish
administrative boards of multiple members and provide reviews every six
months.208 Like GC IV, PRBs are determining whether a person poses an
imperative threat to security, although PRBs use the term “significant”
threat.209
However, there are still issues where PRBs do not keep up to date with
GC IV reviews or other procedural guarantees required by IHL. One key
204.
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question is whether the PRBs provide “the necessary guarantees of
independence and impartiality” as required by GC IV. For example, the
fact that the composition of the PRBs may include members of the military
seems to be in line with the composition of boards contemplated in both GC
III and GC IV, but generally such individuals raise questions with respect to
independence, as members of the military are not sufficiently independent
within their chain of command. 210 Likewise, the fact that the Personal
Representative (PR) is working directly for the government agency that is
also running the reviews is problematic, as it would seem to question their
ability to be truly independent of their superior officers, although in practice
this has not seemed to affect the ability of detainees to get positive
decisions. The most troubling factor may be that the Board does not have
the final say for deciding continued detention—due to the oversight of the
Review Committee—which suggests that the Board is not truly
independent.211 Because the Review Committee is comprised of political
appointees, the entire process is politicized. 212 It is encouraging that in
practice the Review Committee appears to have rarely exercised this power,
but it does imbue the process with a lack of independence.
Impartiality is perhaps a more difficult element to assess in the case of
PRBs, as the identity of the Board members is generally not common
knowledge; thus, it is not clear whether any of the individual board
members harbor particular opinions that might put their impartiality into
question. As impartiality is often viewed as a subjective test, one could
imagine that members of the military and intelligence agencies—the
entities responsible for the detention in the first place—do not appear
impartial to the detainees. However, the fact that the Board has overturned
its own decisions would indicate that the cases are reviewed without a predetermined outcome in mind, which is a positive signal.213 In order to
firmly exclude the possibility of discrimination or other biases, it would be
helpful if the impartiality of the board members could be better
institutionalized, perhaps by making their identities more public.
Finally, self-incrimination is also an issue. Generally, the Fifth
Amendment is only relevant with respect to criminal proceedings, but there
is a possibility that even detainees cleared by a PRB might one day face
criminal proceedings in a another country, even if the United States chooses
not to prosecute them. 214 As discussed in Part II, this issue is not clear
under United States law, especially in such a complex legal setting as NIAC
210.
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detention, but there would seem to be some practical if not legal solutions
to this problem. 215 First, the Board could treat the process more like a
parole board by assuming all accusations against the detainee may be true,
but looking only at the future, not the past. This could be reflected in the
types of questions the Board asks and the informal criteria it uses internally
to determine the threat-level. It is clear from current practice that the Board
spends an undue amount of attention on getting the detainee to “confess his
crimes” or to express remorse for the past. 216
A more formal solution would be to offer testimonial immunity to
detainees for any statements made during the PRBs. This novel approach
would serve to allay the fears of detainees (and their lawyers) and
encourage a more robust participation going forward.
V.

CONCLUSION

The initiation of the PRBs—in spite of their shortcomings—provided
detainees with a useful objective and served to reduce tensions within the
detention facility as detainees focus on achieving a positive result of
transfer or release. While this is not a legal reason for maintaining review
processes, it reflects the benefits of providing certainty and predictability of
the detainee’s legal status. By receiving regular feedback on their situation,
detainees are provided not only with an outlet to voice their frustrations but
are also given some insight into the reasons they are perceived as a threat.
Furthermore, detainees are often given direct recommendations on how to
change their behavior to mitigate this perceived threat.217
What the PRBs may lack in compliance with international legal norms,
they make up for in terms of effectiveness and detainee participation.
Moreover, many of the procedural flaws could be addressed to make way
for improved PRBs and improved review processes in other future contexts.
While the process may need to be tweaked for future detainees, particularly
if security detention takes place extraterritorially and closer to the
battlefield, the PRB provides an excellent framework on which to build a
review process fully compliant with international norms.
The United States spent enormous resources developing detention
review processes in Guantanamo—arguably in order to remain compliant
with its obligations under international law—and at least as a matter of
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positive policy.218 While none of the review processes have been perfect,
the PRBs represent the best model thus far. This is not only due to
compliance with international norms, but also because it provides the
detainees with some feedback as to the status of their continued detention,
and requires the authorities to thoroughly consider the necessity of
continuing to detain a specific individual. 219 While the United States may
not consider that these detainees are entitled to such an individual
determination due to their status as “unprivileged enemy belligerents,” as a
matter of policy, the United States should provide independent and
impartial review processes to ensure that it is not detaining persons without
the military necessity to do so.
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